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Abstract: Using a new dataset with detailed geographic information about licensing activities 
of the Max Planck Society, Germany’s largest non-university public research organization, we 
analyze how the probability and magnitude of commercial success are affected by geographic 
distance  between  licensors  and  licensees.  Our  evidence  suggests  that  proximity  is  not 
generally  associated  with  superior  commercialization  outcomes.  A  negative  association 
between distance and commercialization success is identified only for the specific cases of, 
first, spin-off licensees located outside Germany and, second, foreign licensees within the 
subsample of inventions with multiple licensees. 
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1. Introduction 
Creation of new knowledge through research and development (R&D) is the main engine of 
technological change, and technological change is the main engine of growth and employment 
in modern economies. Universities and non-university public research organizations (PROs 
for short) are important generators of new and possibly useful knowledge (Salter and Martin, 
2001). It is therefore not surprising that policy  makers around the globe have undertaken 
considerable efforts to strengthen the linkages between public research and the private sector. 
Driven by the motivation to improve the utilization of new knowledge in the economy, the 
Bayh-Dole  Act  of  1980  in  the  U.S.  and  similar  legislative  changes  elsewhere  advanced 
technology transfer as one of the main objectives – a “third mission” – of public research. 
Even though multiple channels of knowledge transfer including publications, conferences, 
consulting, and scientist migration to the private sector are relevant for industrial partners 
(Cohen et al., 2002; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002), recent legislative activities have often 
focused  on  university  patenting  and  licensing  as  instruments  to  commercialize  scientific 
results  (Bozeman,  2000;  Mowery  et  al.,  2001;  Shane,  2002;  Sampat,  2006;  Kenney  and 
Patton, 2009; von Proff et al., 2012). 
Similar to other “markets for technology” (Arora et al., 2001) the market for academic 
inventions is characterized by substantial information asymmetry between the inventor and 
the  potential  licensee  (Shane,  2002;  Siegel  et  al.,  2003;  Lowe,  2006).  More  specifically, 
commercialization of licensed academic inventions is a difficult task for private-sector firms 
because these inventions are usually far from being readily marketable (Jensen and Thursby, 
2001) and the underlying knowledge possessed by the original academic inventors – which is 
often critical for success – is not fully codified (Agrawal, 2006). This raises relevant issues of 
how licensees can best enlist the support of academic inventors in their commercialization 
efforts.  
Several empirical studies have studied the commercialization of licensed university 
technology  at  the  level  of  individual  inventions.  This  research  is  limited  by  the  lack  of 
universities and PROs with sufficient numbers of successfully commercialized inventions, in 
particular  outside  the  U.S..  Existing  empirical  findings  are  therefore  restricted  to  a  few 
leading  U.S.  universities.  Licensed  inventions  by  MIT  scientists  are  explored  by  Shane 
(2002), while  Lowe  and Ziedonis  (2006) study  the University of California system. Both 
studies compare startup licensees with established firms, but do not find evidence suggesting 
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that  the  former  are  disadvantaged.  Also  using  data  on  MIT  inventions,  Dechenaux  et  al. 
(2008)  analyze  how  appropriability  conditions  affect  termination  likelihood  and  the 
commercialization success of licensees. They find that patent strength and secrecy reduce the 
risk of license termination. Elfenbein (2004, 2007) explores the significance of contractual 
provisions and inventor seniority for commercialization outcomes in the empirical context of 
Harvard  University.  He  concludes  that  inventors’  prior  scientific  output  is  positively 
correlated with future licenses but is uncorrelated with the payment structure or the returns of 
the technology. 
Given the traditionally different ownership model for academic inventions in Europe 
(Lissoni et al., 2008) and the ensuing lack of licensing data, very little prior evidence exists 
for Europe. However, studying commercialization outcomes outside the U.S. seems important 
because it raises issues such licensing to foreign licensees that are less relevant and therefore 
underexplored in the U.S. context (Arundel and Geuna, 2004). Within Europe, Germany’s 
large non-university PROs probably provide the best opportunities for empirical research. In 
this context, Buenstorf and Geissler (2012) study inventions from the Max Planck Society. 
They compare the commercialization outcomes for university spin-offs to those of external 
licensees and fail to find systematic differences. 
The  contribution  of  public  research  to  the  regional  innovation  and  growth 
performance has been explored in a long line of prior research. Results have been mixed. 
Some authors (e.g. Jaffe, 1989; Acs et al., 1992; Jaffe et al., 1993; Anselin et al., 1997; Fritsch 
and Slavtchev, 2007) suggest that proximity to public research yields substantial benefits to 
firms’ innovativeness. Likewise, Mansfield and Lee (1996) find that firms prefer to work with 
university researchers who are less than 100 miles away from the firm’s R&D laboratories. 
Based on a survey of R&D laboratories in the U.S., Adams (2002) concludes that geographic 
proximity plays a bigger role in university-firm interactions than in firm-firm interactions. 
Belenzon and Schankerman (2010) find that citation rates of both publications and university 
patents decline sharply with distance.  
Other work tends to see a lesser role for geographic proximity. Audretsch and Stephan 
(1996) show that the majority of links between university scientists and U.S. biotechnology 
firms are non-local. Even among spin-off founders, more than 40% of the researchers in their 
sample  established  firms  outside  the  region  of  their  university.  Similar  results  have  been 
found for Germany (e.g. Grotz and Braun, 1997). In their survey of 2,300 German companies, 
Beise and Stahl (1999) do not detect a higher likelihood to innovate for firms that are located 
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close  to  universities  or  polytechnics.  They  conclude  that  proximity  to  public  research 
institutes does not influence the probability of public research-based innovations. However, 
this result might be due to the  geographic differences between Germany  and the  U.S. as 
pointed out by Salter and Martin (2001). 
Very  little  prior  work  has  studied  the  role  of  geography  in  the  context  of 
commercializing licensed university inventions. Mowery and Ziedonis (2001) compare the 
geographic reach of two important knowledge flows, namely patent citations and licenses. 
They conclude that licenses are more geographically localized than patent citations. Survey-
based  work  by  Santoro  and  Gopalakrishnan  (2001)  suggests  that  geographic  proximity 
favorably affects technology transfer activities between universities and firms. In contrast, 
controlling for inventor involvement in licensees’ commercialization efforts, Agrawal (2006) 
finds no effects of location on commercialization outcomes. 
In the present paper we contribute to this latter line of research, using and extending a 
dataset  with  detailed  information  about  licensing  activities  of  the  Max  Planck  Society, 
Germany’s  largest  non-university  public  research  organization  (Buenstorf  and  Geissler, 
2012). In contrast to the faculty of German universities, Max Planck researchers have never 
enjoyed the professors’ privilege but have consistently been subject to a Bayh-Dole-like IPR 
regime since the 1970s. This circumstance provides us with a rich dataset encompassing more 
than 2,300 inventions and about 770 license agreements for the time period 1980-2004. Our 
data also include detailed information about payments to the Max Planck Society indicating 
whether or not an invention has been commercialized successfully as well as the magnitude of 
the returns. Finally, since we know the locations of both the originating Max Planck institute 
and the private-sector licensee, we can calculate the geographic distance between them.  
We use this information to analyze whether and how probability and magnitude of 
commercial success are affected by geographic distance between inventors and licensees. We 
do not find evidence suggesting that geographic distance is generally a relevant obstacle to 
successful  commercialization  of  academic  inventions.  Significantly  negative  associations 
between distance and commercialization success are identified only in two specific instances: 
first, for spin-off licensees located outside Germany, and second, for foreign licensees within 
the subsample of inventions with multiple licensees. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  The  next  section  presents 
theoretical  considerations  about  the  potential  importance  of  geographic  proximity  for 
commercialization  success.  Section  3  provides  information  about  the  technology  transfer 
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process of the Max Planck Society. Section 4 describes our data and the research design for 
the empirical analysis, whereas results are discussed in section 5. We conclude and discuss 
implications and limitations of our analysis in section 6. 
 
2. Does geographic proximity matter for successful 
commercialization of university inventions?  
Distance and commercialization outcomes  
In a world of heterogeneous firms, allocating licenses to suitable licensees constitutes a non-
trivial problem. Ideally, search processes and negotiations between inventors (or technology 
licensing offices as their agents) on the one hand and potential private-sector licensees on the 
other should result in perfect matching: the most suitable licensee (in terms of capabilities and 
complementary assets) will submit the highest offer for a license and thus become the actual 
licensee. Similar considerations apply if technologies are licensed non-exclusively. Among all 
firms interested in licensing a technology, those willing to pay at least as much as the licensor 
asks for become licensees. Under ideal conditions, this will again allocate licenses to those 
firms  that  can  expect  to  gain  most  from  the  license  because  they  command  superior 
capabilities and/or better suited complementary assets than other potential licensees.   
To structure our further considerations, let us consider the following simple model of 
the behavior of potential licensees. We assume that firm  i is willing to license academic 
invention j iff its expected profit contribution from commercializing the invention is non-
negative, E(πij) ≥ 0. The expected profit contribution depends both on the level of profits that 
the  successful  firm  can  realize  from  the  invention,  πij,  and  on  the  probability  that 
commercialization  efforts  are  successful,  pij.  We  initially  assume  that  only  πij  but  not  pij 
depends on the distance s between inventor and licensee (we will relax this assumption later 
on) such that 
  πij(s) = Rij – Cij(s) with ∂Cij(s) ∂s > 0,  (1) 
 
where Rij and Cij denote, respectively, revenue and costs of producing and selling products 
based  on  the  academic  invention.  Rij  depends  on  inherent  (i.e.,  not  distance-related) 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0615 
 
characteristics of the licensee, and also on characteristics of the licensed invention. Expected 
profits are then given by (because Rij is zero if commercialization fails):  
 
  E(πij(s)) = pij πij(s) – (1 – pij) Cij(s) = pij Rij – Cij(s).  (2) 
 
The main reason to expect that costs of commercialization are higher when licensees 
are  located  farther  away  from  the  inventors  of  the  technology  is  that  distance  plausibly 
increases the cost of inventor involvement. It is well established that at the time of licensing, 
academic inventions have often not been developed beyond the proof of concept stage or a lab 
scale  prototype.  Based  on  a  survey  of  technology  transfer  managers  of  U.S.  universities, 
Jensen and Thursby (2001) find that more than 75 percent of all licensed inventions were at 
an early stage of development. Under these conditions licensees need to make substantial 
R&D efforts of their own to obtain a marketable product from the licensed invention.  
Several studies have moreover found that the success of these additional efforts is 
highly  dependent  on  the  continued  involvement  of  the  academic  inventor(s)  (Jensen  and 
Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2004; Agrawal, 2006). One explanation for this finding 
is  that  not  all  elements  of  knowledge  underlying  academic  inventions  are  accessible  to 
licensees. Licensees’ absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) may be insufficient to 
fully appreciate all information related to academic inventions. Since these inventions tend to 
be highly complex and involve knowledge from overlapping disciplines, they are often far 
from the knowledge base of the licensee (Agrawal, 2006). In addition, relevant knowledge 
may be partially tacit (Polanyi, 1966; Arora, 1995), i.e. it cannot adequately be codified using 
patents, publications or blueprints.  
According to Agrawal (2006), much of the non-codified knowledge in public research 
could in principle be codified; he refers to this type of knowledge as “latent” knowledge. For 
example,  academic  inventions  are  often  based  on  long  series  of  experiments.  These  are 
characterized by failures and disappointments that are usually unreported, i.e. remain non-
codified in the process of academic research. However, information about what was tried out 
and did not work would often be valuable for licensees trying to further develop an academic 
invention. 
Direct  personal  interaction  is  generally  required  for  the  transfer  of  non-codified 
knowledge. Even video-conferencing or e-mails as novel ways of sharing knowledge all over 
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the world cannot fully substitute face-to-face communication and collaboration (McDonough 
and Kahn, 1996). Technology transfer has therefore been described as a “contact sport” in 
which the transfer of knowledge necessitates the participation of the inventor and requires 
face-to-face communication (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2001). Geographic proximity reduces the 
cost of face-to-face interaction due to reduced travel costs and time losses (Beise and Stahl, 
1999;  Santoro  and  Gopalakrishnan,  2001).  This  should  be  most  important  for  high-level 
scientists with high opportunity costs of time used for interaction with licensees rather than 
for doing research (Stephan, 1996).  
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to find out whether the dependence of 
expected profits on distance implied by (2) can be found in empirical data. To do so, we have 
to be more specific as to how we expect potential licensees to react to distance, and how this 
reaction would affect the observable outcomes of commercialization activities: the likelihood 
of successful commercialization and the profits realized through commercialization. A variety 
of outcomes (or scenarios) can be considered plausible in this context. 
We take as our benchmark scenario (Scenario 1 in Table 1) the possibility that, in 
contrast to the above considerations, distance does not substantially influence commercial 
success  from  a  license.  In  this  case,  we  would  expect  that  neither  the  likelihood  to 
successfully  commercialize  licensed  technologies  nor  the  level  of  profits  realized  through 
commercialization vary with the distance between inventors and licensees. 
Alternatively, assume that distance does affect the expected profit contribution from 
the commercialized technologies in non-negligible ways.  In (2) we  assumed that distance 
increases the cost of commercialization. Depending on what assumptions we make about firm 
heterogeneity  and  the  effectiveness  of  competition  for  the  license,  this  may  still  lead  to 
different outcomes. One possibility is that firms are highly heterogeneous. This does not seem 
an unreasonable assumption as markets for technologies from public research are usually thin: 
the number of firms interested in, and capable of, further developing and marketing academic 
inventions is in most cases small (Contractor, 1981; Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Accordingly, 
it may well be that the most suitable licensee for a specific technology happens to be located 
far from the academic inventors, and that its expected profits from licensing exceed those of 
more closely located potential licensees even after accounting for the costs of distance. (In the 
extreme case, it may be the only potential licensee expecting to generate positive profits from 
licensing the technology.) Aware of the fact that interaction with the inventors will be costly, 
the maximum price that this potential licensee is willing to pay for the license will be adjusted 
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downward. Yet since there are no better offers from other potential licensees, the licensor may 
agree to the firm’s terms and the licensing agreement will be concluded. As a consequence, 
we expect that a distant licensee’s profits from successful commercialization are smaller than 
if the same technology had been licensed to a (hypothetical) identical licensee located more 
closely to the inventors. In the aggregate, longer distances between licensees and inventors 
should then be associated with lower profits (Scenario 2 in Table 1). 
Now assume a slightly different situation where two potential licensees compete for a 
license on the same academic invention. One of them is more distant; i.e. it has to bear higher 
costs of commercialization according to (2). To obtain a license, the more distant licensee 
needs to offer at least the same price as the more closely located competitor. This is only 
consistent  with  the  non-negativity  constraint  for  expected  profits  if  the  more  distant 
competitor has a higher inherent probability of successful commercialization compensating 
for  its  disadvantage  in  costs.  Otherwise,  it  will  not  be  able  to  license  the  invention.  Put 
differently, the observable set of licensing agreements is truncated with more distant licensees 
having a higher minimum probability of success. In this situation, we would therefore expect 
to find that inventions licensed to more distant licensees yield lower profits, but have a higher 
chance of being commercialized. This outcome is expressed as Scenario 3 in Table 1. 
There are yet further possible patterns of outcomes. Equation (2) assumed that distance 
reduces profit πij by increasing the cost Cij of commercializing academic inventions, but does 
not reduce the probability pij of successful commercialization. This is obviously a restrictive 
assumption. We now explore the symmetric possibility that distance only affects pij but not 
Cij.  For  example,  imagine  that  licensees  have  a  fixed  budget  for  inventor  interaction  (or 
inventors  have  a  fixed  amount  of  time  allocated  for  firm  contacts).  Increasing  distance 
between licensee and inventor would then reduce the intensity of interaction, which would 
lower the chances that a successful outcome is realized. We can express this situation in a 
variant of equation (2) where pij is a function of distance (with ∂pij(s)⁄∂s	 	0) while Cij no 
longer depends on distance:   
 
  E(πij(s)) = pij(s) πij + (1 – pij(s)) Cij = pij(s) Rij –Cij.  (2') 
 
If (2') is a valid model of expected profits, there are again two alternative scenarios 
analogous to Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively. If a distant firm is sufficiently superior to all 
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other potential licensees to not face effective competition for the license, it will be able to 
negotiate  a  license  agreement  at  a  discounted  price,  thus  satisfying  its  non-negativity 
constraint.  In  the  aggregate  this  should  lead  to  a  negative  association  between 
commercialization likelihood and distance, constituting our Scenario 4. In contrast, if firms do 
face  effective  competition  from  other  potential  licensees  and  therefore  a  lower  bound  of 
licensing fees, profits of more distant licensees have to be higher to satisfy the non-negativity 
condition in spite of their lower commercialization likelihood. Otherwise, distant firms will 
refrain from licensing. Accordingly, in this situation (Scenario 5 in Table 1), higher profits in 
case of successful commercialization have to compensate distant licensees for lower chances 
of success. For the (truncated) sample of observable licensing agreements we therefore expect 
that  distance  is  negatively  associated  with  commercialization  likelihood  and  positively 
associated with profits. 
A look at Table 1 shows that it is difficult to come up with unequivocal predictions 
regarding  the  effect  of  distance  on  commercialization  outcomes.  In  Scenarios  2-5, 
disadvantages  of  more  distant  licensees  may  lead  to  lower  or  higher  commercialization 
likelihoods or profits. In essence, this is due to the fact that only mutually beneficial licensing 
agreements are entered into. The agreements we observe in reality are a selected subsample of 
all  potential  licensing  agreements,  where  potential  licensees  self-select  into  profitable 
agreements.  However,  the  higher  commercialization  likelihoods  (profits)  of  more  distant 
licensees  expected  in  Scenarios  3  and  5  compensate  for  lower  profits  (commercialization 
likelihoods). Thus, if distance is a relevant impediment to successful commercialization we 
may  observe  a  positive  association  of  distance  with  one,  but  not  both  indicators  of 
commercialization outcomes. (In contrast, Scenarios 2 and 4 could be combined to yield a 
negative association with both indicators: if distance affected both costs and probabilities of 
commercialization, this could result in lower commercialization likelihoods and lower profits 
if terms of licensing agreements adjust.)  
There is a plausible scenario in which we would expect more distant licensees to have 
higher commercialization likelihoods and higher profits from commercialization (Scenario 6 
in Table 1). In this scenario, we need to assume that local firms may obtain licenses for 
academic inventions even though they are inherently inferior to more distant firms. This could 
have different reasons. One simple possibility is that distant firms lack information about 
profitable  licensing  agreements.  Alternatively,  it  could  be  that  licensors  of  academic 
inventions are discriminating against more distant potential licensees. This latter assumption 
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is plausible in the context of academic inventions since some universities and other PROs 
pursue regional development objectives as part of their general missions and more specifically 
in their technology transfer activities (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2009). If these objectives 
induce technology licensing offices to license inventions to local firms even though they are 
inferior to more distant competitors, local licensees may show a weaker commercialization 
performance,  in  terms  of  both  commercialization  likelihoods  and  profits,  than  their  more 
distant counterparts. 
 
Licensee-specific effects of distance 
The above considerations about the costs of distance suggest that all other things being equal, 
it may be attractive for licensees to be in the proximity of academic inventors, even in a world 
where  technology  has  dramatically  improved  the  possibilities  and  reduced  the  costs  of 
codifying  and  transmitting  knowledge  across  the  world  by  electronic  communication 
superhighways. In addition, we assumed that all licensees are not equal.  
Some forms of heterogeneity seem especially relevant. In particular, being less well 
equipped with capabilities and complementary assets (Teece, 1986; Teece et al., 1997; Shane, 
2002) academic spin-offs may be more reliant on inventor cooperation. By definition, spin-
offs are organized by academic inventors. Note, however, that often not all inventors of a 
technology join the spin-off. Moreover, even if all inventors are part of the spin-off team, 
proximity to the institute where an invention was made may still yield benefits to the firm 
because  knowledge  held  by  prior  co-workers  in  the  institute  is  relevant  for  its  further 
development  efforts.
  Differences  between  spin-off  and  external  licensees  may  be  further 
pronounced because successful commercialization of a specific invention will often be more 
relevant  for  the  survival  of  a  recently  established  spin-off  licensee  than  for  an  external 
incumbent  licensee  (Lowe  and  Ziedonis,  2006).  Furthermore,  spin-off  licensees  can  be 
expected to be more flexible in their location decisions than external licensees, which in our 
empirical  context  are  almost  exclusively  established  incumbents  tied  to  their  pre-existing 
locations.  Given  these  potential  differences,  we  will  allow  the  effects  of  distance  on 
commercialization outcomes to differ across licensee types in our empirical analysis.
1 
                                                           
1 In unreported OLS regressions with distance as the dependent variable, we found that, controlling for other 
characteristics of inventions and licensees, spin-offs are significantly more closely located to inventors than 
external licensees. 
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Problems  of  knowledge  transfer  and  efficient  collaboration  caused  by  geographic 
distance may be further increased for foreign licensees because international travel tends to be 
more costly and time consuming than domestic travel. Cultural and linguistic differences also 
play an important role, particularly if frequent face-to-face contact is required to access tacit 
knowledge (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Leamer and Storper, 2001). This is particularly 
important  in  a  more  open  European  Union,  where  licensees  in  border  regions  can  be 
geographically close to a public research institution but separated by different languages and 
cultures (Arundel and Geuna, 2004). To allow for the possibility that cultural and linguistic 
differences rather than geographic distance drive differences in commercialization outcomes, 
we will distinguish between domestic and foreign licensees in the empirical analysis. 
 
3. Empirical context: the Max Planck Society 
We analyze the geographic dimension of licensing in the context of the German Max Planck 
Society. Public research in Germany is characterized by a distinctive division of labor. Non-
university public research organizations play an important role in this system, with the Max 
Planck Society being the largest organization focusing on basic research. Its primary task is to 
complement university research by engaging in large-scale, interdisciplinary, or particularly 
innovative activities in science, (parts of) engineering and the humanities. The Max Planck 
Society  receives  almost  80  per  cent  of  its  budget  from  public,  institutional  funding  and 
employs  close  to  5,000  researchers  (Max  Planck  Society,  2008).  These  work  in  80 
disciplinary  or  topical  institutes.  Geographically,  Max  Planck  Institutes  are  dispersed 
throughout  the  country;  in  most  cases  they  are  located  close  to  a  public  university.  The 
geographic  dispersion  reflects  the  federalist  character  of  the  German  political  system,  as 
federal and regional governments (Bund and Länder) share the costs of supporting the Max 
Planck Society. The roots of the Max Planck Society date back to the early 20
th century when 
its predecessor was established. While the number of institutes has increased substantially 
over time, most institutes have been located in the same city for decades, while their research 
agenda has shifted substantially over time. New institutes are generally located in the vicinity 
of  universities.  Given  the  Max  Planck  Society’s  mission,  proximity  to  relevant  industrial 
partners is not a major consideration in location choices. 
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  Already  before  the  professors’  privilege  was  abolished  in  Germany  in  2002,  Max 
Planck researchers, just like employees of private-sector firms, were (and still are) subject to 
the law on employee inventions. This law mandates that employees have to disclose their 
inventions to their employer, which is the legal owner of the intellectual property. To manage 
its patent applications and technology licensing, the Max Planck Society in 1970 established a 
legally independent technology transfer subsidiary, which is presently named Max Planck 
Innovation GmbH. Staff members of Max Planck Innovation, which is co-located with the 
Society’s central administration in Munich, regularly visit the individual institutes to solicit 
the disclosure of new inventions. Patent applications are handled in cooperation with external 
patent attorneys. Technologies are marketed to domestic and foreign firms, including spin-
offs. The latter have been actively supported since the early 1990s.  
Max Planck Innovation has concluded more than 1,500 license agreements since 1979 
(Max  Planck  Innovation,  2007).  Accumulated  returns  from  technology  transfer  activities 
exceed € 200 million, with most income resulting from a handful of “blockbuster” inventions. 
In the case of successful licensing, academic inventors receive 30 per cent of all revenues, and 
the Max Planck Institute employing the researcher gets an additional third of all income. The 
Max  Planck  Society  uses  the  residual  income  to  finance  the  operations  of  Max  Planck 
Innovation. 
 
4. Data and methods 
Data 
The present study is based on information provided by Max Planck Innovation GmbH that has 
been  analyzed  in  earlier  work  by  Buenstorf  and  Geissler  (2012).  The  dataset  covers  all 
inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers from the mid-1960s to the beginning of 2005. 
In total 3,012 inventions have been disclosed to the Max Planck Society, of which 1,885 
resulted in  a patent application.  Information is  available  about the date of disclosure  and 
patent application, the institute that the respective invention comes from, invention-specific 
characteristics such as the involvement of senior scientists, as well as whether an invention 
has been licensed or not. 
Our  empirical  analysis  focuses  on  the  subset  of  all  864  inventions  that  have  been 
licensed to private-sector firms. Since a number of inventions are licensed non-exclusively to 
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multiple  licensees,  there  are  in  total  1,172  license  agreements.  Furthermore,  a  substantial 
number of license agreements cover multiple inventions licensed to a single licensee in a 
bundle. Lacking more detailed information on the value of the individual inventions combined 
in such bundles, we treat them as separate observations in the empirical analysis, dividing 
observed royalty payments (if any) equally among the bundled inventions and including an 
indicator  variable  denoting  bundled  licenses  in  the  model  specifications.  For  each  license 
agreement, information is available about the name, type and the location of the licensee, the 
dates of conclusion and (possibly) termination, as well as all amounts and dates of payments 
based on the license agreement.  
To minimize right censoring problems, we restrict the sample to inventions disclosed 
2004  or  earlier  while  using  information  about  licenses  and  payments  up  to  2007.  The 
empirical analysis is further restricted to inventions disclosed in 1980 or later for two reasons: 
First, before 1980 Max Planck Innovation (then named Garching Innovation GmbH) pursued 
a different overall strategy. For example, it not only managed inventions disclosed by Max 
Planck researchers, but also offered its services to external customers, mostly other public 
research organizations. Second, information available for the pre-1980 inventions is inferior 
to  that  related  to  the  later  inventions.  These  restrictions  leave  us  with  a  total  of  2,376 
disclosed inventions. Of these, 773 have been licensed; they are subject to a total of 1,047 
license agreements.  
Sample  size  is  further  reduced  by  restricting  the  analysis  to  license  agreements 
providing for sales-dependent royalty payments in the case of successful commercialization 
by the licensee. This restriction is necessary because the commercial success of a licensed 
technology is not directly observable but has to be inferred from the incidence and level of 
positive  royalty  payments.  Our  data  include  yearly  royalty  payments  for  all  individual 
contracts from conclusion to 2007 or prior termination.
2 In total, 731 contracts provide for 
royalty payments (with or without additional fixed fees), of which 365 (50 percent) have been 
successfully  commercialized  (Table  2).  Accumulated  payments  for  the  individual  license 





                                                           
2 Payments are discounted to the base year 2000 and are adjusted to Deutsche Mark. 
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Variables 
In line with the considerations in section 2, the subsequent empirical analysis employs two 
different indicators of successful commercialization. First, we constructed a binary variable 
indicating all license agreements leading to positive royalty payments for the Max Planck 
Society. Second, to also account for differences in the returns from license agreements, we 
employ the logged sum of discounted royalty payments from the licensee to the Max Planck 
Society  as  an  alternative  indicator  of  commercial  success.  Royalty  payments  are  mostly 
proportional to the licensee’s total revenues from the commercialized academic invention. 
They  constitute  the  best  proxy  we  could  obtain  for  the  profit  contribution  made  by  the 
respective invention (cf. also Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). 
The principal explanatory variable in the empirical analysis is the geographic distance 
between a licensee and the institute where the licensed invention was developed. Our measure 
of geographic distance was constructed as follows. We used postal addresses to derive latitude 
and longitude measures of the locations of licensors and licensees. Employing the method 
suggested by Sorenson (2004), these were then transformed into radian values to calculate 
geographic  distances.
3  In  total,  720  distances  were  calculated  for  the  restricted  sample 
between all licensing Max Planck Institutes and their corresponding licensees. Since the Max 
Planck Society licenses its inventions on a global scale, geographic distance ranges from 0 to 
more than 16,000 kilometers.  
As the distribution of distances is highly skewed we employ the natural logarithm of 
this variable (Figure 2a). Alternatively, distance is measured by a set of indicator variables for 
different ranges. To pick up interactions within the same urban area, our smallest category 
includes  all  distances  shorter  than  50  kilometers.
4  The  other  distance  ranges  are  50-100 
kilometers, 100-500 kilometers (corresponding to the maximum distance that can normally be 
covered  in  a  daytrip),  as  well  as  all  distances  larger  than  500  kilometers.  To  study 
international licensing, licensees are further classified in domestic and foreign according to 
their  postal  address.  Because  our  theoretical  considerations  focus  on  physical  distance 
between the parties to a license agreement, foreign subsidies located in Germany are counted 
                                                           
3 Even though Germany is a relatively small country, accounting for the earth’s curvature is relevant in our 
context because of the presence of international, particularly intercontinental license agreements. Travel times 
are inferior to geographic distance in our context because they vary over time and are difficult to reconstruct 
reliably for earlier years. 
4 Belenzon and Schankerman (2010) similarly use a 25-mile distance as their smallest category in studying 
knowledge flows from university research. 
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as German licensees. Of the 731 licenses for inventions disclosed between 1980 and 2004, 
227 are classified as foreign and 502 as domestic. Based on this distinction we classify our 
distance measure into domestic or foreign distance. Figure 2b depicts log distance for both 
domestic and foreign licensees.  
The analysis includes further information about licensees as well as inventions and 
their  inventors.  Licensees  are  classified  into  spin-offs  (i.e.,  firms  started  by  Max  Planck 
researchers)  and  external  licensees  on  the  basis  of  the  Max  Planck  Innovation’s  spin-off 
database. In total 228 license agreements with spin-offs and 470 with external licensees have 
been identified.
5 We also employ an indicator variable denoting repeat licensees for which 
earlier license agreements with the Max Planck Society can be found. (This includes a number 
of spin-offs). This variable is motivated by the conjecture that if later license agreements are 
related to earlier ones, their odds of commercialization may be larger due to pre-established 
contacts and accumulated knowledge. 
Inventions are classified according to the section of the Max Planck Society  from 
which they originate (biomedical section versus chemistry/physics/technology section)
6 and 
whether or not they were invented at one of the leading five institutes in terms of disclosed 
inventions (which jointly account for 42% of all inventions). To identify inventions by senior 
researchers, an indicator variable denotes inventions having a Max Planck director among 
their inventors. Directors are the top-level researchers employed at the Max Planck Society. 
Depending on its size, each institute has between two and about twelve directors, many of 
whom  can  be  considered  star  scientists.  The  dataset  includes  282  cases  of  director 
involvement in the licensed invention. Time effects (older inventions are exposed longer to 
the hazards of licensing and commercialization than are younger ones) are recorded by an 
integer variable denoting the year of disclosure starting with a zero in 1980. 
We also employ information about patent applications related to licensed inventions. 
Patent applications indicate that intellectual property on the underlying technology can in 
principle be obtained. This could facilitate commercialization because it is less risky for the 
licensee to spend money on the further development of the technology. On the other hand, 
with patented inventions, strategic use of the intellectual property and “shelving” become 
options  for  the  licensee,  which  may  be  reflected  in  reduced  commercialization  rates  (cf. 
                                                           
5 Small numbers of licensees could not be classified reliably; they are omitted in the empirical analysis. 
6 The Max Planck Society also has a third, social science, section. No invention in our dataset originated from 
this section. 
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Buenstorf and Geissler, 2012). Finally, to control for differences across technology fields, 
licensees are classified into three broad sectors using standard industrial classification (SIC) 
codes.  More  precisely,  we  first  divided  firms  into  manufacturing,  services,  and  others. 
Manufacturing  firms  were  then  further  divided  into  chemical  products,  instruments  and 
related products, as well as other manufacturing products and equipments. This makes for a 
total of five different fields of licensees.  
 
Empirical approach 
To assess the influence of geographic distance on commercialization outcomes, we estimate a 
set of models where we regress our measures of commercial success on a variety of licensee 
and technology characteristics, controlling for time effects. This leads to the general model: 
 
      =    +          +      +      +        (3) 
 
where y measures  commercial success of invention  j licensed to firm i. Specifications of 
model (3) vary  according to dependent variables. To analyze the likelihood of successful 
commercialization, a series of Probit models is estimated in which the dependent variable 
takes the value of one if positive royalty payments have been realized and zero otherwise. 
Tobit models are employed to estimate models in which accumulated license payments are the 
dependent variable. Payments are left-censored at zero which is taken into account in the 
Tobit models. Given that accumulated payments are highly skewed, we employ the natural 
log. Throughout the analysis, standard errors clustered by inventions are estimated to control 
for the occurrence of multiple licensing of the same technology.  
Our empirical analysis is subject to several econometric concerns. One of these is 
selection  bias,  which  may  be  caused  by  two  different  processes.  First,  commercialization 
outcomes are only observable for the subset of licensed inventions, which are a non-random 
sample of all inventions. To control for the bias that could result from non-random selection 
into licensing, we applied the two-stage estimation procedure proposed by Heckman (1979). 
As we show in more detail in the appendix, inventor characteristics are well-suited to explain 
selection into licensing. The empirical results of the Heckman models (reported in Table A1 
in the appendix) indicate that non-random selection into licensing is not of major concern for 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 06116 
 
our  sample,  as  we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  commercialization  outcomes  are 
independent of selection into licensing. 
The second potential selection problem concerns licensee characteristics. Specifically, 
licensing decisions of spin-offs may differ substantially from those of external licensees. This 
is  consistent  with  the  empirical  results  obtained  by  Buenstorf  and  Geissler  (2012)  in  the 
empirical  context  of  the  present  study.  To  allow  for  differences  in  the  factors  shaping 
commercialization  outcomes  of  both  licensee  types,  including  our  distance  measures,  we 
estimate our principal models jointly for spin-offs and external licensees, and also separately 
for the two types of licensees.  
The sample split into spin-offs and external licensees also helps to limit the problem 
that  distances  between  inventors  and  licensees  may  not  always  be  exogenously  given. 
Endogenous location choices driven by the objective to be close to the origins of the licensed 
technology are a particularly relevant concern in the case of (first-time) spin-off licensees. In 
contrast, most external licensees in our sample are large, pre-existing firms, and there are no 
indications they set up new facilities to commercialize in-licensed Max Planck technologies. 
We address the endogeneity issue by re-estimating (3) using instruments for the inventor-
licensee distance.  
Finally, while we analyze a homogeneous institutional context and control for a range 
of licensee and technology characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity across inventions may 
still  affect  observed  commercialization  outcomes.  For  the  majority  of  inventions  (those 
licensed to a single firm), we cannot avoid this problem. However, for the smaller subset of 
inventions that were licensed non-exclusively to different firms, we also report results from 




We begin by estimating how the distance between inventors and licensees is related to the 
likelihood  that  a  licensed  invention  is  successfully  commercialized  (indicated  by  positive 
royalty  payments).  Model  1a  (Table  6)  is  estimated  for  the  full  population  of  licensed 
inventions.  It  finds  no  evidence  that  commercialization  outcomes  vary  with  the  distance 
between inventors and licensees. Significant marginal effects are obtained for several other 
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variables  included  in  the  model.  First,  more  recent  inventions  are  less  likely  to  be 
commercialized than older ones. This finding (which is also reproduced in the subsequent 
models) may in part reflect the right-censored nature of our data. However, we suspect that it 
also indicates a reduced average quality of inventions, which may result from new entry of 
inventors into the market for technology.
7 Second, we find that patented inventions are less 
often commercialized than those for which no patent application is documented. This result is 
robust throughout our further analysis. It suggests that both spin-offs and external licensees 
obtain a substantial share of licenses for strategic reasons. In addition, spin-offs appear to be 
less likely to commercialize (the marginal effect of the spin-off variable is significant at the 
10% level). Model 1b and 1c, respectively, re-estimate the same model separately for spin-
offs and external licensees. The main result of Model 1a is reproduced: geographic distance is 
not systematically associated with differences in commercialization likelihoods. As regards 
the other explanatory variables, differences between the types of licensees are modest. 
  Tobit  estimations  of  specifications  analogous  to  Models  1a-c  but  using  logged 
accumulated royalty payments to the Max Planck Society resulting from a license (our proxy 
of profits) as dependent variable are reported as Models 4a-c in Table 7. Similar to the results 
for commercialization likelihood, no systematic effects of geographic distance are suggested 
by these models.
 8 
  We further probe these findings in Models 2a-c (Table 6) and Models 5a-c (Table 7), 
where  the  continuous  (log)  distance  variable  is  replaced  by  indicator  variables  denoting 
ranges of distances from 50-100, 100-500 and 500+ kilometers. (Inventions licensed within a 
50-kilometer range from the inventors form the omitted reference group.) This leads to very 
similar results for the full sample (Models 2a and 5a) and for the external licensees (Models 
2c and 5c). In both cases, neither the likelihood nor the extent of commercial success varies 
across the distance ranges. In contrast, for the spin-off sample Models 2b and 5b suggest 
superior outcomes for licensees located in the 100-500 kilometer range from the inventors. 
However, similar to Models 1a-c and 4a-c, there is no evidence suggesting that even more 
distant licensees are disadvantaged vis-à-vis firms located in close proximity to the inventing 
Max Planck Institute. In addition, none of the positive coefficients obtained in the models is 
counterbalanced  by  a  negative  coefficient  for  the  alternative  indicator  of  successful 
                                                           
7 Similar temporal patterns have been found for patents of U.S. universities (c.f. Henderson et al., 1998). 
8 As a robustness check we alternatively estimated OLS regressions. This did not lead to qualitative differences 
in results.  
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commercialization.  This  is  not  suggestive  of  distant  firms  compensating  lower 
commercialization likelihoods with higher profits or vice versa (as was suggested above in 
Scenarios 3 and 5).
9  
  In Models 3a-c (Table 6) and 6a-c (Table 7), the continuous distance measure from 
Models 1a-c (4a-c) is split up into separate measures  for domestic and foreign licensees. 
Results from these models lend little support to the conjecture that distances across national 
borders have more adverse effects than domestic distances. For the full dataset analyzed in 
Model  3a,  a  significantly  positive  marginal  effect  of  domestic  distance  is  estimated.  The 
marginal effect for the distance to foreign licensees is significantly smaller (p>0.04) and not 
significantly  different  from  zero.  In  the  corresponding  Model  6a  we  likewise  find  a 
(marginally) significant positive association of domestic distance, but not of foreign distance, 
to the level of royalty payments. Both marginal effects do not differ significantly from each 
other (p>0.21). Looking at the individual types of licensees, the most pronounced patterns are 
obtained for the spin-off licensees studied in Models 3b and 6b. In both models, increasing 
domestic distance is associated with more favorable outcomes, while increasing distance to 
foreign licensees is related to inferior commercialization results. In contrast, for the external 
licensees both measures are insignificant and do not differ from each other (Models 3c and 
6c).  
  As  noted  above,  the  distance  between  inventors  and  licensees  may  plausibly  be 
endogenous in the case of newly established spin-offs, which might strategically select their 
location to benefit from the proximity to the origins of licensed inventions.
10 To address the 
endogeneity  concern,  we  estimated  models  of  commercializing  outcomes  using  an 
instrumental  variable  (IV)  for  the  distance  between  inventors  and  spin-off  licensees. 
Specifically, we identified the founders of all spin-off licensees and retrieved their place of 
birth, primarily using biographic information from Ph.D. dissertations and from a published 
directory  (Max  Planck  Society,  2006).  We  then  calculated  the  distances  between  founder 
birthplaces  and  the  locations  of  the  respective  licensing  institutes,  and  used  these  to 
                                                           
9 We also experimented with (unreported) models using linear and quadratic measures of the continuous distance 
measure employed in models 1a-c. Both terms are insignificant in all specifications, which is not indicative of 
systematic effects of distance on commercialization outcomes.  
10 To some extent, this concern is mitigated by the fact that only about 50% of the inventions licensed to spin-
offs  were  licensed  in  the  spin-off’s  first  two  years.  For  the  subsequent  licenses  obtained  by  spin-offs, 
endogeneity of location choices seems much less of a problem.  
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instrument the distance between spin-off location and licensing institute.
11 These distances 
qualify  as  an  instrument  because  they  are  exogenous,  correlated  with  the  potentially 
endogenous distance variable, and do not predict commercialization outcomes.
12 Choosing 
them  as  an  instrument  is  based  on  the  empirical  observation  that  entrepreneurial  location 
choices are often biased toward the entrepreneur’s home region (cf., e.g., Dahl and Sorenson, 
2011). Even though most scientists move repeatedly during their career, we still expect this 
bias to show in spin-off location patterns.
13 
  Results of the IV regressions are reported as Models 7 and 8 in Table 8. Model 7 is an 
instrumental  variable  probit  regression  analogous  to  the  above  Model  1b  (the  coefficient 
estimates obtained for that model are also reported in Table 8 to allow for comparisons). The 
IV  probit  finds  a  positive  association  between  distance  and  commercialization  likelihood, 
which however is insignificant and considerably smaller than in the simple probit model. 
Coefficients for the other variables are nearly similar to Model 1b. Model 8 uses an IV tobit 
model analogous to Model 4b. It finds a negative association between distance and levels of 
royalties, which again is far from attaining statistical significance. We thus conclude that 
accounting  for  potential  endogeneity  of  spin-off  locations,  we  still  do  not  find  evidence 
suggesting systematic effects of distance on commercialization outcomes. 
  Finally, to assess the role of unobserved heterogeneity across inventions, we estimate 
model  variants  including  indicator  variables  for  each  licensed  invention  to  control  for 
invention-specific effects. This approach is obviously limited to the subset of inventions that 
were licensed more than once (120 inventions yielding a total of 272 observations). Results 
from these models are of limited generality. Since exclusive access to a technology enhances 
the  chances  that  a  licensee  can  recoup  its  R&D  expenditures,  we  would  expect  those 
                                                           
11 In some cases, information about birth places could not be obtained. Where possible, we used the location of 
the  respective  individual’s  Ph.D.  as  a  substitute.  Three  observations  had  to  be  eliminated  from  the  sample 
because neither birth places nor Ph.D. locations could be identified. In the case of founder teams, distances were 
calculated for the first founder listed. We alternatively experimented with selecting the most senior (in terms of 
academic standing) founder in the team to estimate the distance used as an instrument. While IV regressions 
using that alternative instrument led to qualitatively identical results to the ones reported below, they are less 
trustworthy because the instrument is considerably weaker.  
12 The instrument’s correlation with the distance between spin-off location and licensing institute is 0.32. In a 
model analogous to Model 1, we obtained a coefficient estimate of -0.002 and a z-value of -0.03 (p > 0.979) for 
the instrument. Its first-stage F-statistic in a 2SLS IV regression of royalties analogous to Model 4b is 12.048. 
13 Recent work in entrepreneurship (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson, 2011) finds a positive association between startup 
success and regional founder backgrounds, which might compromise the validity of our instrument. However, in 
addition to not finding a systematic relationship with commercialization outcomes (cf. the previous footnote), 
this concern seems less relevant in our context because (i) we use information about birthplaces, which are often 
not close to where founders lived prior to establishing their spin-off, and (ii) we study scientists, who given their 
career specialization are less likely than other entrepreneurs to possess resources that have been suggested to 
underlie the success of regional founders (such as in-depth knowledge about local sources of capital).  
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inventions that require most further development effort by the licensee to be most likely to be 
licensed exclusively. They would therefore not be included in the subset of inventions with 
multiple licensees. We are moreover limited to the level of royalties as a dependent variable, 
because in many cases there is no variation in the binary outcome variable across the licensees 
of a single invention. 
  Three models controlling for invention-specific effects are estimated. Model 9 (Table 
9) replicates Model 4a using the log distance measure. This model does suggest that if the 
same invention is licensed to licensees at different distances, royalty payments decrease with 
the distance between inventors and licensees, which would be consistent with higher costs of 
commercialization  for  more  distant  licensees.  Model  10,  however,  indicates  that  this 
conclusion may be problematic. In this model, which employs the set of indicator variables 
for the alternative distance ranges, licensees located in the 100-500 kilometer range generate 
significantly  higher  royalties  than  those  located  less  than  50  kilometers  away  from  the 
inventors.  Likewise,  licensees  located  more  than  500  kilometers  away  from  the  inventors 
generate  higher  royalties  than  those  in  the  50-100  kilometer  range.  These  nonlinear 
relationships  are  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  argument  that  increasing  distance  impedes 
successful  commercialization  of  academic  inventions.  Finally,  Model  11  distinguishes 
domestic from foreign licensees. Similar to the pattern we had found  above for spin-offs 




6. Conclusions: a regional mission for technology licensing from 
public research? 
In  this  paper  we  studied  potential  effects  of  geographic  distance  on  the 
commercialization of inventions made in public research and licensed to private-sector firms. 
Our findings provide little support to the conjecture that the commercialization of academic 
inventions  is  harmed  by  geographic  distance  between  inventors  and  licensees.  Results 
                                                           
14  One  further  set  of  models  was  estimated  in  which  we  explored  the  association  of  distance  and 
commercialization  outcomes  changed  over  time,  possibly  because  of  improved  communication  technology 
becoming available in the 1990s. The (unreported) results do not suggest systematic differences between the 
subsamples of pre-1995 and later inventions.  
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suggestive of adverse effects of distance were only obtained for foreign spin-off licensees, 
and  for  foreign  firms  among  multiple  licensees  of  inventions.  The  above  theoretical 
considerations moreover indicated that a positive association between  geographic distance 
and  commercialization  outcomes  could  be  consistent  with  adverse  effects  of  distance, 
provided that distant licensees self-select into profitable licensing agreements. As we argued 
above,  this  should  result  in  higher  commercialization  likelihoods  compensating  for  lower 
profits or vice versa (Scenarios 3 and 5 in Table 1). While we cannot directly observe licensee 
profits,  based  on  our  proxy  variable  –  accumulated  royalty  payments  to  the  Max  Planck 
Society  -  we  find  no  evidence  that  this  kind  of  compensation  can  explain  the  positive 
coefficients obtained for some distance measures in some models. We thus conclude that 
geographic  distance  is  generally  not  an  important  determinant  of  commercialization 
outcomes.  
  Earlier results obtained by Agrawal (2006) indicate that inventor involvement plays a 
crucial role for commercialization academic inventions. In light of his evidence, our results 
suggest that inventor involvement is not seriously impaired by geographic distance, not even 
for  senior  and  “star”  scientists.  This  interpretation  resonates  with  the  earlier  findings  by 
Audretsch and Stephan (1996) that the majority of firm-scientist links in U.S. biotechnology 
were non-local. At the same time, while they only observed that interaction patterns were 
dispersed  geographically,  our  results  provide  evidence  that  this  dispersion  seems  to  be 
functional. 
  Some  universities  and  public  research  organizations  emphasize  their  mission  to 
support regional private-sector R&D activities. Preferential licensing to regional firms might 
be considered as one type of policy to attain this objective. Our results do not suggest this 
would be an efficient strategy from a societal perspective. This conclusion is in line with the 
finding of Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) that U.S. universities that pursued strong local 
development objectives generated about a third less income per license than those that did not. 
It runs counter, however, to the importance that policy makers and university administrations 
often attribute to the role of interactions with regional firms. 
  The above analysis is not without limitations. While focusing on a single organization 
helps  limit  the  impact  of  organizational  policies  on  observed  outcomes,  the  Max  Planck 
Society’s dedication to basic research may limit the extent to which our findings generalize to 
other organizational contexts. In addition, we already discussed potential issues of selection, 
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimates addressing these concerns indicate 
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that  the  main  results  are  not  driven  by  endogeneity  or  unobserved  heterogeneity,  but  we 
cannot conclusively rule out this possibility.  
In  the  broader  context  of  regional  impacts  of  public  research,  the  present  study 
indicates that distance may be much less important for knowledge transfer via contractual 
licensing relationships between public research and private sector firms than for other transfer 
channels such as disclosure via publications and patents or labor mobility. Apparently, some 
of the “real effects of academic research” (Jaffe, 1989) are more localized than others, and the 
multidimensional nature of knowledge transfer is still not sufficiently well understood.  
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Table 1: Predicted effects of distance on outcomes 
Scenario  Characterization 
Effect of distance on 
probability of 
commercialization 
Effect of distance on 
licensee profits 
1  Costs of distance negligible  o  o 
2  Distance increases cost;                  
no effective competition for license  o  – 
3  Distance increases cost;                  
effective competition for license  +  – 
4  Distance reduces comm. likelihood;                  
no effective competition for license 
–  o 
5  Distance reduces comm. likelihood;                  
effective competition for license 
–  + 
6  Discrimination against more distant 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
  All inventions  Licensed inventions with provisions for 
royalties  
obs  mean  min  max  obs  mean  min  max 
Commercialization          731  .499  0  1 
Log royalties          731  4.783  0  19.109 
Log distance          720  5.380  0  9.692 
Time (1980=0)  2,376  14.503  0  24  731  13.432  0  24 
Biomedical section  2,264  0.604  0  1  719  0.776  0  1 
Director involvement  2,376  0.130  0  1  731  0.386  0  1 
Patent application  2,376  0.633  0  1  731  0.702  0  1 
Spin-off licensee          731  0.327  0  1 
Foreign licensee          729  0.311  0  1 
Bundle          731  0.294  0  1 




Table 4: Correlations between covariates (all inventions), 1980-
2004 




Time  1.000       
Biomed  0.071  1.000     
Director involvement  0.026  0.168  1.000   
Patent  0.003  -0.010  0.156  1.000 
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Table 5: Correlations between covariates (license agreements providing for royalties), 1980-2004 
715 observations  Time  Ln distance  Biomed  Dir. Inv.  Patent  Spinoff  Foreign  Bundle  Repeat Lic. 
Time  1.000                 
Ln distance  -0.132  1.000               
Biomed  0.158  0.089  1.000             
Director 
involvement 











Patent  0.056  -0.051  0.079  0.148  1.000         
Spinoff  0.262  -0.425  0.114  0.221  0.201  1.000       
Foreign  -0.019  0.710  0.171  0.139  -0.033  -0.247  1.000     
Bundle  -0.005  0.116  0.016  0.174  0.254  0.259  -0.022  1.000   
Repeat licensee  0.046  -0.130  0.137  0.163  0.214  0.297  -0.157  0.345  1.000 
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Table 6: Likelihood of commercialization (Probit), marginal effects, 1980-2004 
Comm = 1  Model 1a (all licensees)  Model 1b (spin-offs) 
Model 1c (external 
licensees) 
Model 2a (all licensees)  Model 2b (spin-offs) 
Model 2c (external 
licensees) 
Log distance  0.006  (0.010)  0.010  (0.022)  0.005  (0.014)             
50-100 km              0.168  (0.142)      0.097  (0.153) 
100-500 km              0.053  (0.059)  0.223**  (0.111)  -0.043  (0.080) 
> 500 km              0.064  (0.065)  -0.048  (0.124)  0.045  (0.086) 
Time  -0.015***  (0.004)  -0.030***  (0.009)  -0.013***  (0.004)  -0.015***  (0.004)  -0.030***  (0.009)  -0.014***  (0.004) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.022  (0.062)  -0.256**  (0.117)  0.041  (0.073)  -0.012  (0.064)  -0.290**  (0.115)  0.064  (0.077) 
Patented 
invention 
-0.217***  (0.047)  -0.253**  (0.105)  -0.228***  (0.054)  -0.219***  (0.047)  -0.260**  (0.106)  -0.222***  (0.054) 
Repeat licensee  0.022  (0.055)  -0.296*  (0.167)  0.034  (0.057)  0.016  (0.056)  -0.322**  (0.159)  0.041  (0.058) 
Director 
involvement 
0.034  (0.047)  -0.006  (0.084)  0.045  (0.056)  0.035  (0.047)  -0.019  (0.082)  0.036  (0.056) 
Spinoff  -0.101*  (0.052)          -0.086  (0.053)         
Bundle  0.128**  (0.053)  0.213**  (0.105)  0.124*  (0.065)  0.131**  (0.052)  0.163  (0.098)  0.134**  (0.065) 
Top 5 institute  -0.008  (0.049)  0.198**  (0.089)  -0.051  (0.058)  -0.011  (0.050)  0.172*  (0.069)  -0.052  (0.058) 
Sectoral controls  Included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376)  715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > chi
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.119  0.353  0.079  0.121  0.369  0.084 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively.   
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Table 6: Likelihood of commercialization (Probit), marginal effects, 1980-2004 (continued) 
Comm = 1  Model 3a (all licensees)  Model 3b (spin-offs) 




0.029**  (0.014)  0.039*  (0.022)  0.007  (0.023) 
Log foreign 
distance 
0.010  (0.010)  -0.051**  (0.025)  0.006  (0.016) 
Time  -0.015***  (0.004)  -0.025***  (0.009)  -0.013***  (0.004) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.011  (0.062)  -0.259**  (0.116)  0.042  (0.073) 
Patented 
invention 
-0.221***  (0.048)  -0.262**  (0.105)  -0.228***  (0.054) 
Repeat licensee  0.012  (0.055)  -0.414**  (0.165)  0.033  (0.058) 
Director 
involvement 
0.045  (0.048)  0.008  (0.078)  0.045  (0.057) 
Spinoff  -0.081  (0.053)         
Bundle  0.107**  (0.053)  0.158  (0.100)  0.124*  (0.065) 
Top 5 institute  -0.012  (0.051)  0.190**  (0.085)  -0.042  (0.059) 
Sectoral controls  Included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > chi
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.124  0.380  0.079 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Level of royalty income (Tobit), 1980-2004 
Log royalty 
payments  
Model 4a (all licensees)  Model 4b (spin-offs) 
Model 4c (external 
licensees) 
Model 5a (all licensees)  Model 5b (spin-offs) 
Model 5c (external 
licensees) 
Log distance  0.164  (0.194)  0.230  (0.337)  0.147  (0.283)             
50-100 km              3.373  (2.738)      2.192  (2.887) 
100-500 km              0.934  (1.025)  2.709*  (1.489)  -0.719  (1.351) 
> 500 km              1.414  (1.254)  -0.761  (2.248)  1.057  (1.566) 
Time  -0.310***  (0.064)  -0.448***  (0.115)  -0.285***  (0.071)  -0.314***  (0.066)  -0.433***  (0.113)  -0.300***  (0.071) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.536  (1.089)  -3.771**  (1.803)  0.864  (1.290)  -0.281  (1.119)  -3.977**  (1.714)  1.348  (1.357) 
Patented 
invention 
-3.053***  (0.928)  -3.675***  (1.394)  -3.024***  (1.166)  -3.050***  (0.946)  -3.693***  (1.399)  -2.905**  (1.154) 
Repeat licensee  0.818  (0.924)  -3.189  (1.940)  1.194  (0.968)  0.692  (0.932)  -3.395*  (1.890)  1.298  (0.981) 
Director 
involvement 
-0.060  (0.880)  0.101  (1.389)  -0.157  (1.099)  -0.052  (0.895)  0.299  (1.318)  -0.359  (1.088) 
Spinoff  -1.978**  (0.944)          -1.807*  (0.937)         
Bundle  1.778*  (0.991)  2.926*  (1.601)  1.543  (1.240)  1.919**  (0.957)  2.619*  (1.469)  1.825  (1.232) 
Top 5 institute  -0.042  (0.925)  2.374  (1.646)  -0.554  (1.102)  -0.088  (0.941)  2.058  (1.637)  -0.549  (1.102) 
Constant  6.529***  (1.602)  13.765***  (3.520)  5.405***  (1.982)  6.282***  (1.498)  13.263***  (3.349)  5.799***  (1.709) 
Sectoral controls  Included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376)  715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > F
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.041  0.140  0.025  0.044  0.144  0.027 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Level of royalty income (Tobit), 1980-2004 (continued) 
Log royalty 
payments 
Model 6a (all licensees)  Model 6b (spin-offs) 




0.430*  (0.250)  0.606*  (0.333)  -0.091  (0.386) 
Log foreign 
distance 
0.211  (0.192)  -0.726*  (0.424)  0.053  (0.281) 
Time  -0.305***  (0.066)  -0.395***  (0.110)  -0.287***  (0.071) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.393  (1.086)  -3.523*  (1.831)  0.797  (1.289) 
Patented 
invention 
-3.041***  (0.945)  -3.802***  (1.380)  -3.035***  (1.150) 
Repeat licensee  0.689  (0.924)  -4.184**  (1.800)  1.290  (0.973) 
Director 
involvement 
0.103  (0.923)  0.493  (1.319)  -0.251  (1.127) 
Spinoff  -1.792*  (0.941)         
Bundle  1.531  (0.970)  2.287  (1.505)  1.603  (1.224) 
Top 5 institute  -0.094  (0.942)  2.226  (1.589)  -0.496  (1.113) 
Constant  5.533***  (1.758)  12.889***  (3.386)  6.374***  (2.238) 
Sectoral controls  Included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > F
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.042  0.149  0.026 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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(IV probit: Comm = 1)  
(spin-offs) 
Comparison: Coefficient 
estimates from Model 1b 
Model 8 
(IV tobit: royalties) 
(spin-offs) 
Comparison: Coefficient 
estimates from Model 4b) 
Log distance  0.003  (0.169)  0.028  (0.060)  -0.453  (1.313)  0.230  (0.337) 
Time  -0.079***  (0.026)  -0.084***  (0.025)  -0.351**  (0.149)  -0.448***  (0.115) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.642**  (0.323)  -0.666**  (0.301)  -7.466***  (2.139)  -3.771**  (1.803) 
Patented 
invention 
-0.699**  (0.275)  -0.659**  (0.275)  -5.600***  (1.796)  -3.675***  (1.394) 
Repeat licensee  -0.794*  (0.480)  0.274*  (0.439)  -4.347  (3.015)  -3.189  (1.939) 
Director 
involvement 
-0.024  (0.241)  -0.015  (0.230)  -1.703  (1.605)  0.101  (1.389) 
Bundle  0.648  (0.603)  0.588**  (0.296)  4.100  (4.972)  2.926*  (1.601) 
Top 5 institute  0.545*  (0.290)  0.558**  (0.264)  3.022  (2.081)  2.374  (1.646) 
Constant  2.573***  (0.881)  2.515***  (0.663)  21.504***  (6.330)  13.765***  (3.520) 
Sectoral controls  Included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
223  (210)  226  (213)  223  (210)  226  (213) 
P>F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Level of royalty income (Tobit), 1980-2004 (mult. licenses; invention controls) 
Log royalty 
payments 
Model 9 (all licensees)  Model 10 (all licensees)  Model 11 (all licensees) 
Log distance  -0.277***  (0.004)         
50-100 km      -6.880***  (0.085)     
100-500 km      0.712***  (0.065)     
> 500 km      -0.939***  (0.044)     
Log domestic 
distance 
        0.074***  (0.012) 
Log foreign 
distance 
        -0.173***  (0.004) 
Repeat licensee  -0.020  (0.039)  0.182***  (0.035)  -0.045  (0.039) 
Spinoff  -4.561***  (0.049)  -4.474***  (0.077)  -4.648***  (0.082) 
Bundle  0.365***  (0.038)  -0.219***  (0.068)  0.196***  (0.058) 
Constant  -30.094***  (0.033)  -31.821***  (0.031)  -31.449***  (0.034) 




Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
272  (120)  272  (120)  272  (120) 
P>F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.266  0.271  0.266 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Cumulated log royalties, 1980-2007 
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Note: The graph pictures a histogram of the log of cumulated royalty payments from 1980
through 2007 for licensed inventions where licensing agreements provided for royalty
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Note: The graph pictures a histrogram of log distances with a kernel density function of
licensed inventions disclosed from 1980 through 2004 where licensing agreements
provided for royalties.
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Note: The graph pictures two histograms of log distances with a kernel density function of
licensed inventions disclosed from 1980 through 2004: The left histogram depicts the log distance
for inventions licensed to domestic licensees where licensing agreements provided for royalties.
The right histogram pictures the log distance for inventions licensed to foreign licensees where
licensing agreements provided for royalties.
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Appendix A 
Commercialization of technologies from public research is a two-stage process. Technologies 
first have to be licensed. The attempt to sell products based on the licensed technology then 
constitutes the second stage, particularly because inventions from public research are often 
embryonic in nature (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Agrawal, 2006). Not all inventions from 
public research are licensed, and selection of technologies into licensing is most likely not a 
random process. It therefore seems a valid concern that non-random selection into licensing 
may  lead  to  biased  results  when  the  commercialization  odds  of  licensed  technologies  are 
analyzed.  
  In this appendix we show that the empirical analysis presented above is not invalidated 
by  non-random  selection  into  licensing.  For  this  purpose,  the  two-stage  methodology 
developed  by  Heckman  (1979)  is  adopted.  An  equation  for  selection  into  licensing  is 
estimated first, which then informs the second stage equation estimating commercialization 
outcomes.  
In the first stage, the selection equation predicts the likelihood that an invention will 
be licensed. The underlying selection equation looks as follows: 
 
    = 1    +   ≥ 0   (A1) 
 
where z are observable variables and v is an unobserved error term. s is equal to 1 if an 
invention has been licensed and commercial success is observable and zero otherwise. The 
prediction from the first stage is used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio as  (    ). The 
inverse  Mills  ratio  is  then  included  as  an  additional  exogenous  variable  in  the  modified 
version of commercialization equation (3):  
 
      =    +          +      +      +   (    ) +      (A2) 
 
For  the  Heckman  model  to  be  consistent,  the  selection  equation  must  include 
exogenous variables that determine sample selection, i.e. the probability of licensing, but do 
not  directly  affect  the  outcome  of  interest,  i.e.  successful  commercialization.  Results  by 
Buenstorf  and  Geissler  (2012)  indicate  that  technologies  (co-)  invented  by  Max  Planck 
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directors have higher chances of being licensed, while their commercialization odds are not 
different from other inventions. This suggests an impact of reputation effects on the chances 
of technologies being licensed. Second, explanatory variables in the outcome equation should 
also be included in the selection equation provided they are observable. Explanatory variables 
that are not observable in the first stage have to be excluded from the selection equation. 
In line with the empirical strategy employed above, two types of models are employed 
to control for selection bias: To investigate the likelihood of commercial success we initially 
employ Probit models at both the selection and the outcome stages. Subsequently, Probit 
models  are  employed  in  the  selection  stage  whereas  the  outcome  stage  estimates  the 
magnitude of cumulated royalties. 
Results of the various model specifications are reported in Table A1-A2.
15 The inverse 
Mills ratios as an additional exogenous variable are not significant in each regressed model. 
This implies that the null hypothesis that both the likelihood and the magnitude of commercial 
success are independent of selection into licensing cannot be rejected throughout. Estimations 
obtained  in  the  outcome  models  are  quite  similar  to  the  corresponding  Probit  and  Tobit 
models with respect to directions and significance levels.  
 
                                                           
15 We report results of the second stage, i.e. the likelihood and magnitude of commercial success. Results of the 
first stage, i.e. the likelihood to license, or the likelihood to license to each subgroup (spinoffs, externals) are 
available upon request.  
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Table A1: Likelihood of commercialization (Heckman), 1980-2004 
Comm = 1 
Model A1a (all 
licensees) 
Model A1b (spin-offs) 
Model A1c (external 
licensees) 
Model A2a (all 
licensees) 
Model A2b (spin-offs) 
Model A2c (external 
licensees) 
Log distance  0.013  (0.024)  0.029  (0.060)  0.013  (0.036)             
50-100 km              0.428  (0.388)      0.246  (0.407) 
100-500 km              0.133  (0.149)  0.600**  (0.291)  -0.109  (0.201) 
> 500 km              0.157  (0.165)  -0.129  (0.355)  0.110  (0.217) 
Time  -0.036***  (0.009)  -0.084***  (0.025)  -0.028**  (0.012)  -0.037***  (0.010)  -0.084***  (0.024)  -0.031**  (0.012) 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.107  (0.114)  -0.016  (0.249)  -0.191  (0.219)  -0.108  (0.115)  -0.092  (0.245)  -0.157  (0.218) 
Biomedical sec.  -0.092  (0.162)  -0.667**  (0.311)  0.047  (0.199)  -0.066  (0.168)  -0.784**  (0.311)  0.113  (0.210) 
Patented inv.  -0.566***  (0.125)  -0.675**  (0.311)  -0.584***  (0.145)  -0.570***  (0.127)  -0.723**  (0.312)  -0.568***  (0.145) 
Repeat licensee  0.051  (0.139)  -0.770*  (0.436)  0.084  (0.144)  0.037  (0.139)  -0.839**  (0.423)  0.103  (0.147) 
Spinoff  -0.259**  (0.132)          -0.219*  (0.133)         
Bundle  0.322**  (0.135)  0.579**  (0.296)  0.320*  (0.172)  0.331**  (0.133)  0.441  (0.278)  0.347**  (0.174) 
Top 5 institute  -0.011  (0.121)  0.553**  (0.265)  -0.105  (0.142)  -0.020  (0.123)  0.482*  (0.267)  -0.112  (0.142) 
Constant  0.861***  (0.284)  2.561***  (0.902)  0.820**  (0.394)  0.792**  (0.269)  2.682***  (0.902)  0.809**  (0.360) 
Sectoral controls  included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376)  715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > chi
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.120  0.353  0.080  0.122  0.369  0.084 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table A1: Likelihood of commercialization (Heckman), 1980-2004 (continued) 
Comm = 1 
Model A3a (all 
licensees) 
Model A3b (spin-offs) 




0.071**  (0.036)  0.112*  (0.063)  0.017  (0.057) 
Log foreign 
distance 
0.024  (0.025)  -0.144**  (0.071)  0.014  (0.039) 
Time  -0.035***  (0.010)  -0.073***  (0.024)  -0.028**  (0.012) 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.134  (0.117)  -0.058  (0.242)  -0.193  (0.222) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.071  (0.163)  -0.701**  (0.311)  0.048  (0.199) 
Patented 
invention 
-0.579***  (0.128)  -0.726**  (0.305)  -0.584***  (0.146) 
Repeat licensee  0.025  (0.139)  -1.094**  (0.472)  -0.082  (0.145) 
Spinoff  -0.208  (0.134)         
Bundle  0.269**  (0.135)  0.442  (0.292)  0.319*  (0.171) 
Top 5 institute  -0.020  (0.124)  0.557**  (0.264)  -0.106  (0.143) 
Constant  0.691**  (0.295)  2.679***  (0.906)  0.805*  (0.415) 
Sectoral controls  included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > chi
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.125  0.380  0.080 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table A2: Level of royalty income (Heckman), 1980-2004 
Log royalty 
payments 
Model A4a (all 
licensees) 
Model A4b (spin-offs) 
Model A4c (external 
licensees) 
Model A5a (all 
licensees) 
Model A5b (spin-offs) 
Model A5c (external 
licensees) 
Log distance  0.159  (0.194)  0.236  (0.336)  0.145  (0.282)             
50-100 km              3.362  (2.734)      2.200  (2.890) 
100-500 km              0.943  (1.025)  2.750*  (1.485)  -0.715  (1.350) 
> 500 km              1.393  (1.255)  -0.723  (2.251)  1.052  (1.567) 
Time  -0.309***  (0.069)  -0.455***  (0.115)  -0.290***  (0.096)  -0.313***  (0.071)  -0.44***  (0.113)  -0.315***  (0.096) 
Inverse Mills 
ratio 
-0.113  (0.851)  -0.318  (1.495)  0.136  (1.692)  -0.110  (0.863)  -0.539  (1.418)  0.464  (1.675) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.586  (1.169)  -3.856**  (1.895)  0.899  (1.440)  -0.332  (1.206)  -4.147**  (1.821)  1.480  (1.530) 
Patented 
invention 
-3.071***  (0.943)  -3.833**  (1.593)  -3.032***  (1.145)  -3.069***  (0.963)  -3.927**  (1.562)  -2.929***  (1.134) 
Repeat licensee  0.804  (0.923)  -3.210*  (1.927)  1.189  (0.967)  0.677  (0.932)  -3.418*  (1.877)  1.294  (0.980) 
Spinoff  -2.014**  (0.946)          -1.832*  (0.939)         
Bundle  1.770*  (0.994)  2.852*  (1.606)  1.548  (1.240)  1.906**  (0.960)  2.539*  (1.472)  1.828  (1.232) 
Top 5 institute  -0.056  (0.895)  2.352  (1.653)  -0.581  (1.039)  -0.102  (0.909)  2.042  (1.642)  -0.618  (1.036) 
Constant  6.693***  (2.038)  14.592***  (5.018)  5.258*  (3.135)  6.422***  (1.845)  14.678***  (4.929)  5.261**  (2.675) 
Sectoral controls  included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376)  715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > F
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.041  0.140  0.025  0.042  0.144  0.027 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 06142 
 
Table A2: Level of royalty income (Heckman), 1980-2004 (continued) 
Log royalty 
payments 
Model A6a (all 
licensees) 
Model A6b (spin-offs) 




0.431*  (0.250)  0.614*  (0.332)  -0.090  (0.386) 
Log foreign 
distance 
0.207  (0.192)  -0.724*  (0.422)  0.052  (0.282) 
Time  -0.301***  (0.072)  -0.408***  (0.110)  -0.296***  (0.098) 
Inverse Mills 
ratio 
-0.274  (0.888)  -0.738  (1.417)  0.273  (1.730) 
Biomedical 
section 
-0.494  (1.164)  -3.755**  (1.899)  0.873  (1.433) 
Patented 
invention 
-3.072***  (0.963)  -4.110***  (1.569)  -3.050***  (1.129) 
Repeat licensee  0.671  (0.923)  -4.206**  (1.788)  1.283  (0.973) 
Spinoff  -1.822*  (0.943)         
Bundle  1.519  (0.973)  2.208  (1.507)  1.607  (1.225) 
Top 5 institute  -0.090  (0.909)  2.223  (1.590)  -0.542  (1.043) 
Constant  5.883***  (2.064)  14.862***  (4.890)  6.054**  (3.073) 
Sectoral controls  included 
Number of obs. 
(inventions) 
715  (564)  226  (213)  489  (376) 
P > F
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.042  0.149  0.026 
Standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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